Dr Aliyu Modibbo worked in The
Presidency for over 12 years in various capacities. Later, he served as Minister in different ministries in the governments of former presidents
Olusegun Obasanjo and Umaru Musa Yar’adua.
SUNDAY TRUST approached him
to discuss the intricacies involved in the transition from one
government to another. In this interview, the former minister, who
earned a PhD for his studies and research into the politics of
presidency across the globe, revealed the politics involved in the
process.
The much-awaited 2015 presidential election has come and gone. What’s your take on its outcome?
First
and foremost, let me congratulate Nigerians for this smooth transition
from one government to another. I also congratulate the president-elect.
I must commend the outgoing President Goodluck Jonathan for the
statesmanship, which is unprecedented in Africa. President Jonathan has
written his name in the annals of history as one of the African heads of
states to accept a defeat in a contested election like ours. By and
large, Nigerians were apprehensive about the 2015 elections, and
everyone thought doomsday was coming. Certainly, if it were not for the
conduct of some individuals and Mr President, as well as the opposition,
things would have really been bad for us. The greatest of all is the
prayers by Nigerians, and God has answered our prayers for a smooth
transition. We’re hoping that the governorship election will be the
same. From now on, we can say we’ve joined the democratic nations of the
world.
Between now and May 29 is the
transition period from President Jonathan to General Buhari, the
president-elect. During a period like this, what usually happens in The
Presidency, based on your long years of experience and being a scholar
in this field of study?
In my view, based on my experience
of working in The Presidency for over 12 years in Aso Rock Villa, and
being a scholar in Presidential Studies, we’ve got it wrong in the
transition from one government to another. There was no transition
between the government of the late Tafawa Balewa and the late Aguiyi
Ironsi. It was a coup and the leaders of that government were killed;
hence there was no transfer of institutional memory of the Balewa regime
to Ironsi. Also, when Ironsi was removed, there was no transition. When
Gowon took over, the government had to start everything from the
scratch. There was no institutional memory because everybody was chased
away. When General Obasanjo took over from General Gowon, it was the
same disruptive process. There was no continuity, no institutional
memory. Even if there was, they would be very few because the
governments that took over would say they wanted to start everything
anew. They would not be mindful of certain things that were in place
before they came in.
The first actual transition we can think of was
the one from General Obasanjo to Alhaji Shehu Shagari in 1979. The
transition was clearly demarcated. Records were compiled, passed and
handed over to the new government. But because Alhaji Shagari was
inheriting a military regime which had no mandate from the people, it
was very difficult to continue with the programmes which Obasanjo
started. Certain things had to collapse eventually. If you recall,
during Obasanjo’s second coming in 1999, he lamented that when he left
government, there was an airline, shipping line, etc, but he did not
meet any of them when he returned. But because the government that took
over from him was a democratically elected one, it had to alter the
programmes to certain levels; and the accountability requirement was
different.
By the time Shagari was toppled by Buhari, there was no
transition. Everybody was thrown away, except for the permanent
secretaries. Some of us who have been ministers have realised that
permanent secretaries don’t tell ministers the truth. When I was removed
as FCT minister and another minister came, even in the same government,
the permanent secretary didn’t guide the minister about the programmes
in place which needed to be continued. Unlike me, when I took over from
Nasir el-Rufai, I was properly briefed and I knew some of his programmes
that I needed to continue with, some I needed to adjust, etc. In
administration, it’s good to refine programmes, not to throw away what
has been in place before you took over. But permanent secretaries, as a
result of either eye service, lack of commitment, incompetence,
laziness, I can’t tell, don’t push the political principal to continue
to see the merits of some of the programmes that were in place.
By
the time Buhari toppled Shagari, all the programmes were jettisoned and
new ones were put in place. Then came President Babangida, and of
course, there was no proper transition. Everybody was removed. And then,
Babangida stepped aside for Shonekan, but there was no proper
transition, like a template. The man was left on his own, so transition
didn’t take place.
It’s the same when Abacha overthrew Shonekan, and
the same with Abacha/Abdulsalami. Abacha died and Abdulsalami took
over, therefore, there was no transition in the process. I have been
part of the process from the era of Babangida/Shonekan because I
witnessed those ones. The other ones I’ve mentioned I know based on my
study and research into the history of The Presidency in Nigeria.
The
first proper transition that took place, in my view, was the one
between Abdulsalami and Obasanjo in 1999. At that time I was in the
Office of the Staff Officer to the Head of State. I’ve been there since
the Abacha regime. I had to midwife the transition package, in terms of
the documentation, programme outline of what had happened in
accountability. Since 1999, there has been a duality of structure in
government, particularly under the Head of State or President. You have
the State House, and you have The Presidency, which is like under the
Secretary to the Government of the Federation. The SGF is in charge of
the wider bureaucracy in the Ministries, Departments and Agencies. The
task of compiling institutional memory of the Head of State or the
President resides in the Aso Rock Villa. This is done by the principal
secretary, chief of staff, etc. So we had to package the transition in
two phases. The first part was the substantive one - the institutional
memory of all the MDAs, accountability. Then we had the ceremonial part
of the programme: how the handover activities would be. On the
instruction of General Abdulsalami, I was responsible for the collecting
of all the documents from the MDAs. We put them in 20 volumes. Each
ministry submitted its programmes and visions.
What happens when transitions are not done properly?
When
transitions are not done properly there could be serious dangers. When
Abacha started Vision 2020, a very cardinal programme of government,
chaired by Chief Ernest Shonekan, he brought people from all over the
country and other parts of the world. A wonderful document was produced
for each milestone in every aspect of the polity and economy. Because
there was no proper transition, by the time Abdulsalami came, it was put
aside and jettisoned. By the time Obasanjo came, it was not mentioned
in the transition. Then the Obasanjo regime in 1999 started replicating
some of the things in the Vision 2020 document. The discussion on the
Vision 2020 took about a year. The document was dumped. The Petroleum
Trust Fund (PTF) under General Buhari, for example, was a great
programme. If there was a proper transition, that programme would have
continued. But it was just thrown away, then later we started
duplicating the programmes: NAPEP, SURE-UP. These were things done by
other regimes.
What is the process of a proper transition?
The
first step is for the president to ask all ministers and direct them to
prepare and submit their ministerial briefs and handover notes.
Promptly, a transition committee will be set up. In 1999, I recall that
the outgoing Abdulsalami government had its own transition committee and
the president-elect Obasanjo had his own team. But what was remarkable
was that by the time Obasanjo came for the briefing, his transition
committee under General T.Y Danjuma, Ahmed Joda, Dele Cole, Phillip
Asiodu, etc, already had their prepared documents and plan, which they
were not going to share with the outgoing ministers. They came for about
two or three briefings and it didn’t continue. But I need to say that
even the transition briefings are normally conducted at different
levels. The one I’ve just described is the intense level. Then you had
the sectorial briefing by key sectors, like the service chiefs, SSS,
NIA. They would brief the incoming president. In 2003, Obasanjo was just
handing over to himself. There was only the ceremonial handover.
From your studies, do you sense a kind of suspicion between the outgoing and incoming teams?
In
the transition in 1999, I could see that there was this nonchalant and
condescending attitude for the outgoing regime. The incoming regime was
populated by heavyweights, especially because of the Generals on the
incoming transition committee. They were not enthusiastic about what the
outgoing administration was handing over. The exception was when
Obasanjo identified some talents. When the then Minister of Power,
Engineer Bello Suleiman was briefing the team, Obasanjo was fascinated
by the explanation of the minister, and immediately gave the minister a
job as Managing Director of the PHCN. Obasanjo had made up his mind to
make the late Chief Bola Ige Minister of Power, so he had to make
Engineer Suleiman head of the PHCN. It was also during such briefing
that Obasanjo identified the talents of Mallam Nasir el-Rufai and picked
him as head of the Bureau for Public Enterprises (BPE). Even Steven
Orosanye encountered Obasanjo and was picked for a key position in The
Presidency. What happened in 1999 between Abdulsalami and Obasanjo is
similar to what is going to happen between President Jonathan and
General Buhari.
Why do you say they would be similar?
I
say so because, just like the then incoming PDP under Obasanjo thought
that the military had messed up the country, and whatever the military
had done was upside down, and there was need for reconstruction, that’s
the kind of attitude we have now. The APC believes the PDP has messed up
the country in the last 16 years and they are coming with a new
template. If we’re not lucky we’ll fall into the same trap that the
Abdulsalami/Obasanjo was caught in. Hopefully, the president-elect and
his people would see that a proper transition is done, leaving nothing
left unturned to understand the programmes of the outgoing government
and pick the ones that are good, refine them and continue with them;
pick the ones that are outdated and do away with them. This not to say
that even within the same government, there are no challenges. If you
take the Yar’adua/Obasanjo, there was a kind of enthusiasm because it
was like Obasanjo was handing over to his godson, somebody that he
believed would carry on with his programme.
Another problem in
transition is that you may have people who belong to different eras or
generations, or people who are not attuned to the realities of the
moment. For instance, when Obasanjo came in 1999, he had been out of
government for almost 30 years. All his team when he returned were like
his friends. They were part of the government the previous 30 years.
It’s like the kind of thing that would happen in the Buhari
administration under the All Progressives Congress (APC). If one is out
of government for 32 years, his primary source of information is the
media. Primarily, he’s not in government to feel what was happening.
His template, knowledge, memory would be from the previous era,
particularly for someone who had been a Head of State. He may feel that
it’s the same State House that he left 32 years ago that he’s returning
to. It’s just like Obasanjo thought he was returning to the Civil
Service he left in 1979 that he would meet in 1999. Everything has
dramatically changed. If you come to government with an old template,
you’re bound to introduce a dramatic reversal of everything. But
hopefully, because of the composition of the APC (many of them have been
in power in contemporary Nigeria), things may be done differently. But
there may be some persons behind the team with whom the president-elect
had worked before who may come on board. So there must be understanding
of this reality and things should be done pragmatically.
You were actively involved in the Obasanjo/Yar’Adua transition. What happened?
I
had known Yar’adua for over 12 years before he was elected president in
2007. We were very close. I was a Minister of Commerce (on my second
ministerial appointment) before he came to power. I saw that he was a
little bit disorganised. He had very little knowledge of people beyond
his domain in Katsina. Those around him were from Katsina; they had not
worked with the Federal Government before then. When he came, I advised
him to appoint intelligent people into the transition committee, and he
advised me to act as coordinator of the process. I asked him to talk to
Obasanjo to allow me do it, and the former president agreed. We started
the process quite well, the ceremonial part and the institutional
aspect.
For the second part, Obasanjo took full control of it
because he wanted the briefing to be very thorough. As a matter of fact,
we spent two days non-stop, doing marathon briefing. It became a little
bit superfluous for the same government handing over to another. But
Obasanjo wanted everything to be thoroughly explained to the incoming
president. But you can see that even with all of that, Yar’Adua had his
own idea of what he wanted to achieve. It was later on I discovered it.
After all the briefing, he called me and asked me to take down his
7-Point agenda which he wanted us to put in his inaugural speech, which
he did. His mantra, which was a little bit different, was rule of law,
anti-corruption, power sector reform, etc. We may even hear all this
when the APC regime comes on board. At that time, political appointments
were not discussed (during the transition).
In my view, there are
certain appointments that should be in place before the transition is
done. It’s not proper to begin to scout for key ministers after the
transition is completed. You may need some key officials, especially
those who don’t need the National Assembly’s approval before their
appointments. For instance, it’s good to have the SGF in place before
the transition is done. Even if he’s not so named, he should be
attending the briefings, and the president should take him into
confidence by saying he would be the SGF. That position is very crucial
for the country’s bureaucracy. It’s the institutional memory of
government since colonial times. The Chief of Staff is something new.
President Yar’Adua had to jettison it and adopted the traditional
position of principal secretary, which I think was not a good idea.
Also,
the National Security Adviser should be with you during all the
briefings. Hopefully, everything would be done differently this time,
not like the zoning principle in the PDP, where the SGF is zoned. Zoning
the SGF will prevent the president from choosing the best person for
that job. During that Yar’adua era we settled for Ambassador Babagana
Kingibe because he was a permanent secretary, an ambassador and he was
prominent in and outside Nigeria.
We hear some ministries have
hidden bank accounts. Is it possible for some permanent secretaries to
fail to do full disclosure during a transition period?
Definitely.
Let me give you an example, when we came we found, in the Ministry of
Works, that there was an outstanding liability of ₦1 trillion of work
done, but not paid for. Even at the FCT, I had certificates of works
done by contractors worth ₦145 billion. But it was not in the handover
note given to me. Therefore, my focus had to change. If I had to service
the debt from the ‘envelop’ given to me as minister, it meant I could
not embark on new projects. It would be better, if during this
transition, the president-elect and his team are told the magnitude of
liabilities in each ministry and the quantum of money we have. This will
inform how they would approach issues when they assume office. Then
you have key ministries that must do full disclosure - petroleum,
finance, Central Bank of Nigeria. They need to brief the incoming
president one-on-one fully about what monies are where. It’s very
important. The president will know the landmines that he’s getting. He
would find a way to communicate that to the public. When I told
President Yar’Adua of the liabilities I inherited, he told me there was
no need for me to start opening up new districts in the FCT. But people
began to criticise me for not opening up new districts. I was not given
land allocations because by the time I came I realise that my
predecessor had given out some 27,000 plots of land. My view was that
land is the capital, the oil of Abuja. So if all the land had been given
out, there was little I could do. People didn’t realise that those
obligations entered into by the previous regime were obligations that
must be honoured. The contracts needed to be paid for.
I’m glad to
hear that the APC government is thinking of changing the modus operandi
of the Federal Executive Council, where every Wednesday, FEC awarded
contracts. A FEC should be like the one during the Balewa regime. It was
always a meeting where policy matters were discussed. Expenditures were
taken as a very last resort when approval is given by the president as a
very last resort. But because we are in an era of political patronage,
people, even cabinet members, feel they need to know when contracts are
awarded. Then, the constitution says that every state must have a
minister. The ministers were largely sponsored by governors, so they
don’t see the president as the one appointing them. Their allegiance is
to their governors. But now, with the process of putting the president’s
election before the governors,’ the governors will not hold the
president to ransom with the argument that they helped the president to
power.
During the transition under Yar’Adua, we failed a real
problem over governors’ prerogative in the appointment of ministers. The
late president asked me to send out letters to governors, requesting
each PDP to send in three people for consideration as ministers. He
instructed that where the governor was PDP, the letter should be written
directly to him; where there’s no PDP governor, it should be written to
the chairman of the party, a copy sent to the PDP candidate that lost
the election. When we did it and the return came back, we saw that the
first names of each list were those of outgoing governors to be
considered as minister. At first, he didn’t put any former governor as
minister, but subsequently, he succumbed when he did the cabinet
reshuffle. I’m sure the APC will go through that dilemma. Jonathan faced
it, where all the outgoing governors wanted to be ministers or
senators. Hopefully, the APC will overcome that challenge. If the
president knows his ministers very well before he appoints them, it
would make the job easier for him. That was what Obasanjo did the first
time. He brought in people he knew very well - Bola Ige, T.Y Danjuma,
Zango Daura, Adamu Ciroma, etc. Later on, he began to appoint younger
elements into the regime.
From hindsight, what kind of challenges do you expect Buhari to face when he assumes office on May 29?
The
most fundamental, in my view, will be his team in the State House.
Whatever you may say, if you have a good team in the State House it will
be implemented properly. State House is the clearing house of the
presidency. If he makes the right appointment of all his immediate
aides, he will succeed. If he wants to fight corruption, everybody in
the State House must be above board; they must share the same ideal;
they must not go cutting corners; he must not hear news of anyone of
them doing the contrary. This is because that is the first frontline.
The second frontline is that of an excellent SGF and NSA, and the third
tier is the ministers. Nothing should be taken for granted. Even the
cleaner in the State House, the gardener, secretary, chief of staff,
permanent secretary, the media assistants. They must all buy into the
mantra.
When we used to work in the State House, we used to say our
loyalty and allegiance was to the president, not to the wider
bureaucracy. We were for him, to protect his image, to make sure his
programmes were understood and implemented correctly. The other aspect
the president-elect must understand clearly is that things have changed.
So he must endeavour to understand the reality of the times. He must
not use the template of 1983 to measure today. State House is not the
same, ministries are not what they used to be. If I must give you an
example, the first week Obasanjo came into office there was a FEC
meeting, and usually, I would write my minute one or two days later. The
meeting ended about 2.00pm, and Obasanjo called my boss at 5.00pm,
saying he wanted to have the minute. I said I would give the minute to
my boss tomorrow, but he said, no, Obasanjo told him that was not how
they used to work in the past. What I’m saying is that there are good
practices of the past that could be revived, but Buhari should realise
that not all can be brought back. Again, during our time, no mistake was
entertained in any written communication from the president’s office.
But some time ago, a friend called me to say he had a letter written
from the presidency, and that there were five mistakes in it. He was
shocked. During our time, it was absolutely not possible. A letter
passes through several checks, due diligence would be done before they
were passed to the president for signing. So Buhari would need to ensure
that due diligence is done before decisions are taken, particularly
because this is one of the most popular mandates given to any government
in this country. People are expecting a lot; they’re expecting miracles
or magic. But as it is said, Rome is not built in a day. We wish the
incoming administration every success.